# Retained Evidence Drill threat model

The hostile boundary includes packet truncation, extra members, path aliases,
symlinks, oversized files, verifier or expected-report substitution, borrowed
receiver context, forged correction authority, stale or mistargeted
corrections, packet-carried trust substitution, and a report or delta that does
not follow from the retained bytes.

The launcher replaces common Node network interfaces before verifier import and
fails if a call is observed. This is an application-level guard, not an
operating-system network sandbox. The clean-directory regression extracts only
the public archive and runs from packet members: repository input and prior
receiver state are not supplied, installed Bulla is not used, and no site route
is requested.

The packet root is served by the same Glyph Standard origin as the packet. It
is a byte-identity check, not independent witnessing or deployment provenance.
